When out on a walk choosing what kind of ice cream to order, choosing which course to take at university or if to smoke a cigarette – are we even free to choose? Or could we have made a different choice? Am I the author of my own actions as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Kant maintained or is it God, my brain or another power unbeknownst to me? Or, to put the point differently, is Nietzsche right that free will is a mere illusion? And what is free will and freedom of action? What is the difference and what is the principle of freedom?
In looking at a waterfall we imagine that there is freedom of will and fancy in the countless turnings, twistings, and breakings of the waves; but everything is compulsory, every movement can be mathematically calculated. So it is also with human actions; one would have to be able to calculate every single action beforehand if one were all-knowing; equally so all progress of knowledge, every error, all malice. The one who acts certainly labours under the illusion of voluntariness;
(Nietzsche: Human, all too human. I, 2,106)
The metaphysical debate about free will and moral responsibility draws on our self-image as humans, our conscience and our intuitive understanding of freedom and this is the reason why philosophers, physicists and neuro-scientists have been butting heads for decades. So far, three different positions have emerged: libertarianism, determinism and compatibilism. The libertarian posits that I alone am the author of my actions, whereas the determinist asserts that all physical events are determined by laws of nature and are thusly causally inevitable. The compatibilist however devises a solution by declaring free will and determinism as compatible.1
No agreement can be reached between those positions as further problems or caveats arise such as Quantum mechanics2 or the Causal Closure Principle3. As I tend towards compatibilism, this could be an argument for it:
P1: I am the source of my own actions but not of the facts of the past and the laws of nature as such.
P2: I can change my actions while acting but not the facts or the laws.
C: My freely chosen actions coexist with the facts and laws.
This ongoing debate in philosophy demonstrates only that we need to distinguish free will from freedom of action and the principle of freedom. What is meant by free will (liberum arbitrium4) is the freedom to determine my own will and not to be determined by anything else. Freedom of action however means that I am free to do what I want to, but there is the possibility of me being determined by external factors such as the alcoholic is by his addiction for instance.
What is a necessary condition for freedom then? Having a choice or as the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt put it „the principle of alternate possibilities”5? But do I always have a choice6 and if, in what sense? Frankfurt denies alternative possibilities as criterion for freedom in his theory of free will. Free will is not to act freely but to will freely. Frankfurt determines that the structure of a person’s will is what makes a person. It’s being capable of rational behavior and of being master of one’s own will. There are two levels of volition: first order volitions such as desires about things that motivate action and second order volitions which are desires about desires. Frankfurt’s distinction of those two kinds of volitions denotes the human ability to reflect on one's own will. The second order volitions are reviewing the first order volitions by taking a stance towards the first order volitions. The one volition (II.) is reviewing the other (I.) within a hierarchical structure according to Frankfurt. It is the second order volition that is vital for Frankfurt’s definition of free will. A person has free will if there is a conformity between his first order and second order volitions. Or to put it simple: If he wills what he wants to will.
So, do we have any free will then? Are we free if we aren’t forced and our will is our own as Frankfurt stated or is everything determined and we only project our self-image as free beings onto causally inevitable events? In the end, it is up to us to decide which chorus of philosophers and scientists we want to follow (see the flawed Libet experiment and the free will fallacies).
The poet Samuel Johnson put this conundrum in a nutshell:
“All theory is against freedom of the will, all experience for it”
(James Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson. vol. 3, Boston: W. Andrews and I. Blake, 1807, p. 13).