My niece who just turned seven and me love to play a game together, called “Rummy”. This is a game at which players have to lay down sets of tiles in four different colours. The player who doesn’t have any more tiles on his rack is the winner. Mathematical skills such as adding, number sequencing and combining patterns are needed. This game is suggested for ages eight and up.

While playing Rummy a couple of weeks ago, we invented a new rule: One player may ask the other player for a certain tile, for example a green 5, and if he gets it, he can then create a set with his own hand and the borrowed tile. Each player only sees his own rack of tiles. The following conversation ensued:

My niece: „Auntie, do you have a yellow 6?”

Me: „No, I’m sorry, my dear, I haven’t.”

Niece: „Do you have a green 11?”

Me: „Unfortunately, neither.”

My niece was smiling at me and asked: „May I have a look at your rack?”

Me: „No, you may not.”

Niece: „Are you lying?”

Me: „No, I’m not lying.”

She looked at me aghast and said: „Aren’t you able to lie?”

This is when I had to laugh hard and replied: „Yes, I am able to lie but I don’t want to lie.”

That’s when my niece raised her eyebrows in astonishment and replied: „But, why not?”

Me: „Because I do not want to be lied to either.”

Niece: „What?”

Now, I had the task to explain Kant’s categorical imperative to a smart 7-year-old. This was what I came up with: „If I don’t want to be lied to by others, then I have to tell the truth myself. How else can I ask of other people not to lie to me? This is one rule that I like and that I always want to live by when playing games.”

Her lapidary reply to my explanation in her childish unbiased manner: „Oh, ok.” And we continued playing happily.

Two things I found interesting in this conversation: First, my niece has already learnt how to lie and she is able to get into another’s mind and to adopt the perspective of another person in a way that small children aren’t able to do cognitively. She realized that it would have been better for me to lie to her in order to not help her win the game.

Second, she knows that telling lies is part of our daily life. If she learnt that by observation or playing with peers, remains to be seen. The possibility of being lied to is something that has to be taken into account from the outset. A conscious effort to refrain from lying was new to her (in this case a self-serving lie for my own self-protection).

In philosophy, it is Augustine who introduces the classical definition of lying as intentionally asserting falsehood.1 For Augustine, all lying is sin as it is a breach of the Ten Commandments. Lying is a communicative act with the aim to spread false beliefs in order to either protect or deceive and harm someone. Kant answers the question if lying is morally acceptable with a resounding and categorical “no” in his essay “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives”. Truth2 (veritas) is to be distinguished from truthfulness (veracitas). “Truth” here denotes a true assertion in accordance with the facts. Truth is propositional – be it in statements or thoughts. Both Kant followed in the footsteps of Plato that truth is not a possession. Truth can be recognized a priori. Truthfulness is defined by Kant as the „subjective truth in his own person”3. Truth is the formal duty that is fundamentally, strictly and unconditionally valid.

… because truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, the laws of which would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the least exception to them were admitted.4

Lying is a wrong done to mankind according to Kant, even lying for the benefit of someone. A liar is legally responsible for the consequences of his lying in Kant’s way of thinking, but not he who speaks the truth. For Kant, lying is a rights violation and as such not permitted, however good the intentions may be which is quite hard to believe in the 21st century. Augustine’s and Kant’s rigorous prohibition on lying seems outdated nowadays, however it might be prudent to anticipate all the consequences of lying – be it in a game or in earnest. (Having steered my niece in the right direction when it comes to the issue of lies is my humble hope).


1 Augustinus: Die Lüge und Gegen die Lüge. p. 7. Hg. v. Paul Weseling, Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986.

2 Bernard Williams pursues the question if there even is an objective truth as such. See Bernard Williams: Wahrheit und Wahrhaftigkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013, p.11. See also Nietzsche (Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, 1872) who denotes truth as mere illusion.

3 Immanuel Kant: “Über ein vermeintliches Recht aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen”, A 301, 302, 303.

4 Ibid, A 306, 307, 308.